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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Where there has been an exception to the necessity for intent, it has accrued
in statutes intended to maintain a public policy. Many instances are to be found
in regulatory measures stemming from the exercise of the police power which
emphasizes the achievement of some social betterment rather than the punishment
of crime. Shevrin Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U. S. 57 (1909). The crimes
created primarily for the purpose of singling out wrongdoers for punishment or
correction commonly require mens rea. Those punishable without it are mainly
offenses which are regulatory in nature and involve light fines rather than imprison-
ment. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Col Law Rev. 55 (1933).
The defendant's conviction was properly reversed. Ordinarily for there to
be a felony conviction the defendant's physical act must be accompanied by mens
rea. This is particularly true in the principal case where the statute's express
words are "knowingly converts,' and where the statute is a codification of the
common law crime of larceny which had required a guilty mind.
Charles Ryan Desmond
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-COLLATERAL ATTACK OF DIVORCE
DECREE RENDERED IN A SISTER STATE
This was an action brought by Arthur Cook, the Respondent, against Flor-
ence Cook, the Petitioner, to annul two marriages between the parties. Petitioner
and Respondent were married in 1943. Respondent then learned that his wife was
still married to her previous husband. The parties agreed that Petitioners should
go to Florida and obtain a divorce. Shortly after the divorce Petitioner and
Respondent were remarried. Marital difficulties followed. Respondent brought
the present action in the Vermont courts, to have his two marriages to the Peti-
tioner annulled. He alleged that at the time of his two marriages to Florence
Cook, she was already married. The Supreme Court of Vermont granted the
annulments on the grounds that full faith and credit need not be given to the
Florida decree because Petitioner was not a bona fide domiciliary of Florida at
the time of her divorce. Cook v. Cook, 116 Vt. 374, 76 A. 2d 593 (1950). In as
much as the record does not show whether or not the husband was personally
served or whether he appeared in the Florida proceedings, the United States
Supreme Court remanded the cause for a determination of this issue before it
would allow a collateral attack on the Florida decree. Cook v. Cook, 72 S. Ct.
157 (1951).
Prior to 1942, in order for a spouse to obtain a divorce which was entitled
to full faith and credit, it was necessary that the suit be instituted at the matri-
monial domicile, Atherton v. Atherton 181 U. S. 155, (1901); or there had to
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be personal service on the defendant spouse or an appearance by the defendant
spouse in the divorce.proceedings, Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108, (1869). In
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U- S. 562, (1906), a divorce was obtained in Con-
necticut by a husband who had wrongfully left his wife. Connecticut was not
the matrimonial domicile and there was neither personal service nor an appear-
ance by the wife. It was held that the divorce was not entitled to full faith and
credit, even though the husband was a bona fide domiciliary of Connecticut. The
matrimonial domicile was said to have remained with the wife because the
husband was the wrongful party.
In the first of the famous Williams cases, Williams v. North Carolina, 317
U. S. 278, (1942), the Supreme Court overruled the Haddock doctrine, and held
that a divorce obtained at the bona fide domicile of either of the spouses was
entitled to full faith and credit. In the second Williams case, Williams v. North
Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, (1945), it was held that the forum could refuse to give
full faith and credit if the plaintiff spouse in the divorce action had not obtained
a bona fide domicile in the state where the divorce decree was granted. Domicile
was said to be a jurisdictional fact which could be determined de novo by the
forum. The question of what law (i.e. the law of the state of rendition, or the law
of the forum) should be applied in determining if there was a bona fide domicile
was not answered.
The issue of domicile can not be relitigated by the defendant spouse if he
has made an appearance in the court of rendition and contested that issue, Sherrer
v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 (1947), nor may it be relitigated if the defendant
spouse had merely appeared, and the issue of domicile could have been litigated.
Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378 (1948). In Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U. S. 581
(1951), it was held that a third party could not collaterally attack a decree where
the defendant spouse had appeared in the divorce proceeding. In each of the
above situations collateral attack would not be allowed in a sister state, where the
state of rendition would not allow the decree to be collaterally attacked in its
own courts. Sherrer v. Sherrer, supra.
Thus under the rulings of the Sherrer, Coe, and Johnson Cases, the respond-
ent in the principal case would be barred from collaterally attacking the divorce
if the petitioner's husband had either appeared of had been served in the Florida
proceeding because Florida does not allow collateral attack in its own courts.
The principal case adds little to the federal divorce laws. It is but a reaffirma-
tion of the rules laid down in the Supreme Court decisions following the first
Williams case. Collateral attack of a divorce decree is still allowed but there must
be evidence that the defendant spouse did not appear, before a third party can
relitigate the issue of domicile. The majority of the court held that where there
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is no evidence whether the defendant spouse had or had not appeared the case
must be remanded to determine that issue. Justice Frankfurter believed that
where there is no such evidence it must be presumed that the defendant spouse
failed to appear and that therefore the jurisdictional fact of domicile could be
collaterally attacked.
Janet McFarland
WRONGFUL DEATH-ACTION BY WIFE'S ADMINISTRATOR ALLOWED
THOUGH WIFE COULD NOT HAVE BROUGHT ACTION HAD SHE LIVED
Plaintiff, administrator of the estate of a woman who was killed by her
husband, sued the executor of the husband's estate under the Illinois Wrongful
Death Statute. Held: Even though the wife could not have maintained an action
in tort had she lived, because a wife cannot sue her husband in tort in Illinois, her
administrator can sue her husband's executor for wrongful death. Welch v. Davis,
410 IlL 130, 101 N. E. 2d 547 (1951).
At common law all civil actions for personal injuries abated with the death
of either the injured party or the wrongdoer. Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493,
170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K. B. 1808); Putnam v. Savage, 244 Mass. 83 at 84, 138
N. E. 808 at 809 (1923). In 1846 the English adopted a wrongful death statute
known as Lord Campbell's Act (9 and 10 Vict, c. 93). It allowed an action for
the death of a person whenever the person himself could have sued for the injury
had he survived. Such a statute was enacted in New York. L 1847 c. 450, now
in N. Y. Decedent Estate Law §§130-134. Today every state has a similar statute.
Wrongful death statutes are not survival statutes giving a right of action for a
personal injury to the deceased. G reco v. Kresge Co., 277 N. Y. 26 at 32, 12
N. E. 2d 557 at 560 (1938). The cause of action is one entirely independent
from any that the deceased may have had. It is given to a representative of the
decedents estate as trustee to recover damages suffered by the surviving spouse
and next of kin, because of the death of the deceased. Greco v. Kresge Co., supra.
The first section of wrongful death acts usually provide for liability not-
withstanding the death of the injured person. The second section of the act
provides that the action shall be brought in the name of a personal representative
of the deceased, and the amount recovered shall be for the exclusive benefit of the
widow and next of kin of the deceased, and that the jury may give such damages
and compensation as "they deem fair. See, N. Y. Decedent Estate Law §130.
The provision limiting the death action to those cases when the deceased
might have recovered damages had he lived is the crucial section in the instant
